The Dynamics of Political Change and Transition: Civil Society, Governance and the Culture of Politics in Kenya by Okello, D.
199
10 ·  The dynamics of political change and 
transition: civil society, governance and the 
culture of politics in Kenya
D U N C A N  O K E L L O
People wrongly assume that when you are in government you speak 
for civil society, yet the dynamics have changed. You have to play by 
the rules or lose the game. People wrongly assume that the values you 
had in civil society are the same values you’ll continue to exercise in 
government. But sometimes you are forced to use strategies that people 
outside might consider underhand, yet the goal you are seeking is justifi-
able (Lawrence Mute, Commissioner, Kenya National Commission on 
 Human Rights, interview, 2006)
Introduction
Since 1990, substantial changes have taken place in Kenya: the econ-
omy has been significantly liberalized, plural politics has taken a firm 
hold and four relatively successful multiparty elections have been held 
since 1992.1 New actors have emerged on the scene, greatly changing the 
architecture of power. Civil society organizations (CSOs), broadly defined 
to include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, profes-
sional bodies, grassroots organizations and trade unions, have been 
instrumental in the push for political reform. Notwithstanding their lack 
of homogeneity (Ngunyi, 1996), NGOs, churches and professional bodies 
have been central in fashioning the intellectual arguments at the heart 
of CSO mobilization. In the second half of the 1980s, leadership was 
provided by church organizations. Between 1989 and 1991 it passed to 
professional associations, and was then – from 1992 onwards – appro-
priated by NGOs (Nzomo, 2003). In the first multiparty elections, held 
in 1992, some civil society leaders were elected to parliament, but they 
managed to retain a strong and active presence in and membership of 
CSOs, effectively straddling the government and CSO spheres.2
Even though democratization and good governance have formed the 
overall defining agenda for civil society struggles, their form, style and 
focus have continually changed. Activities have ranged from  simple calls 
and agitation for minor constitutional reform to allow the  reintroduction 
200
of multiparty politics, to a mass push for a complete constitutional over-
haul. Civil society has also shifted away from its hitherto cardinal and 
sacred principle of ‘non-partisanship’, taking sides in electoral contests 
and openly courting the support of voters – and thus moving from the 
mere provision of civic education to direct political mobilization.
In this chapter, I seek to assess the effect that civil society has had 
on improving the culture of governance in Kenya – by which I mean 
the values, conduct, institutions and structures of political life. I will 
look, in particular, at the aftermath of the 2002 general elections, when 
many civil society actors became part of the government for the first 
time.3 I will argue that the culture of politics before this time was largely 
regressive, undemocratic, unresponsive and unaccountable, and that the 
raison d’être for civil society to intervene (whether as educator, competi-
tor or mobilizer) was to reverse this situation. This orientation is explicit 
and implicit in the work of various CSOs and, particularly, NGOs, which, 
in Michael Bratton’s terms, ‘help to pluralise the institutional environ-
ment and promote a democratic political culture … [as they help to] 
reconstruct state–civil society relations along democratic lines’ (1989: 
568). This is a view shared by many (Pietrowski, 1994; Nyangoro, 1999); 
but it has also been aggressively contested by others, such as Stephen 
Ndegwa (1996), who, in examining two Kenyan NGOs, argues that the 
actions of civil society are not necessarily democratizing. He suggests 
that they exhibit tendencies towards ‘benevolent personal rule’ and 
‘personality politics’, and, because of a lack of proper institutionaliza-
tion, that organizational actions correlate strongly with the preferences 
and actions of individual leaders. CSOs thus become merely ‘resourceful 
platforms for the elite who are not immune to entrenched interests 
(such as class or ethnicity)’ (1996: 5) and are therefore incapable of 
improving on the culture of governance and politics.
Bratton and Ndegwa provide us with an analytical spectrum through 
which to assess the contribution of civil society to improving the culture 
of politics and governance in Kenya. In this chapter, I take the view 
that, whereas the notion of civil society is broad (and the actors within 
it many and diverse), there is a category of civil society that – whether 
because of the advantages of ‘learned’ leadership, the ability to com-
mand resources or a high level of institutionalization – has been more 
visible in reform politics. It is from this high-profile category that the 
political establishment has actively recruited. I do not equate civil society 
with these elite groups, but I do recognize the significant influence that 
they have had in transforming Kenyan politics.
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Civil society: between agency and structure
During the era of active political mobilization, civil society actors 
have taken the view that both structure and agency have been the cause 
of poor governance. Consequently, both of these notions have been 
the focus of civil society interventions. In the early part of the 1990s, a 
greater emphasis was placed on the importance of agency,4 while the 
importance of changing structure gained prominence in the late 1990s, 
as expressed through the constitutional reform struggles of that time.
The agency argument assumed a managerial view of the decay of 
governance and politics in Kenya, positing that a ‘change of guard’ was 
the best cure for the existing governance malaise, as characterized by 
a leadership that was innately undemocratic and unaccountable, and 
that privileged personal survival, rather than performance, as a basis 
for legitimacy. The agency argument was also supported by the nascent 
opposition parties in 1992 which, convinced of their imminent victory in 
the elections, believed that a focus on constitutional reform would only 
allow the incumbent Kenya African National Union (KANU) to prolong 
its hold on power and delay the task of replacing bad state managers. 
It came as a surprise to them that KANU used a defective constitutional 
order not only to win the elections but significantly to frustrate efforts 
to improve the culture of politics and governance in Kenya for the next 
ten years (Mutunga, 1999). 
The ‘structural school’, on the other hand, argued that the poor state of 
governance in Kenya was a function of weak and poorly designed systems 
and institutions. While agency was important, it ceased to be sufficiently 
important as a factor, especially in terms of expanding the democratic 
space as rapidly as the structural school felt was desirable. Its advocates 
insisted on institutional and constitutional reform as necessary precon-
ditions for an improvement in the culture of politics and governance. As 
long as institutions such as the electoral commission, parliament, the 
judiciary and the executive remained unreconstructed, they argued, even 
new agents would find it difficult to behave differently (ibid.).
Codifying the reform agenda: issues for civil society intervention
Informed by the realities surrounding structure and agency, civil 
 society interventions were powered by two objectives: institutional re-
form and reform of the values of both leaders and citizens. Continued 
state authoritarianism and unaccountability were seen as a consequence 
of citizens being deliberately kept in ignorance of their rights (and so 
unable to exercise or lay claim to them) – hence the civic education 
initiatives. Similarly, state institutions had been seriously undermined 
